The New Right, Neoliberalism, and the Real of Capital by Büscher-Ulbrich, Dennis
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 2 (2018): 4-19 
 
Büscher-Ulbrich: The New Right, Neoliberalism, and the Real of Capital 4 
The New Right, Neoliberalism, and the Real of Capital 
DENNIS BÜSCHER-ULBRICH 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Germany 
 
 
Trump/ism and Conjunctural Analysis 
The lasting effects of the unresolved financial and economic crisis that began with the 
bursting of the US housing bubble in 2007 and the ongoing global crisis of accumulation 
have led to the re-emergence in public discourse of the idea that capitalism could end. For 
those who believe that “there is no alternative,” it gave way to a latent sense of a crisis of 
civilization. For many, it was proof of the notion that capitalist modernity has an intrinsic 
tendency towards crisis. While this re-generated socialist and communist hopes of 
capitalism’s ultimate demise, the virtually unchallenged hegemony of neoliberal 
governance gave way to a massive wave of right-wing populist and neo-fascist reaction. 
Since the 2016 American elections the focus has predictably turned away from Bernie 
Sanders and Occupy to the spectacle of Donald J. Trump. The rise of Trumpism in many 
ways mirrors the rise of Bonapartism that Karl Marx analyzed in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte, showing how class struggle itself “created circumstances and 
relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part” (Marx 
1985: 57). As Sam Miller and Harrison Fluss note apropos the prospect of an “American 
Bonapartism,” 
[t]he political parallels of 19th century France and 21st century America are striking 
and telling. Even the date November 9 corresponds to the 18th of Brumaire in the 
French Revolutionary Calendar. Both countries prepared the groundwork for the 
rise of authoritarian politics through the increasing desperation of poor and 
working people and a decimated left that subordinated itself to capitalist parties. In 
these outbreaks of common discontent, members of vulnerable groups found 
themselves lured in by the siren song of right-wing strongmen. (2016: n.pag.) 
 As Marx knew very well, of course, political-economic conditions are never absolutely 
determining. The field of social contest is held in tension, dialectically, by both the capacity 
of humans to “make their own history” and “circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past” (Marx 1979: 103). Both Trump and Bonaparte found their base 
of support in the middle class, certain sections of the working class, the rural poor, and 
Republican elites. Bonaparte’s chauvinist speeches to some extent anticipate Trump’s 
rally rants, and both excelled in exploiting economic crisis by way of right-wing populism 
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and national chauvinism. In fact, Marx’s descriptions of Bonaparte sound like echoes of 
Donald Trump’s clownish media persona: “clumsily cunning, knavishly naive, doltishly 
sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, a cleverly stupid anachronism, a 
world-historic piece of buffoonery and an indecipherable hieroglyphic for the 
understanding of the civilized—this symbol bore the unmistakable physiognomy of the 
class that represents barbarism within civilization” (1978: 80). Trump’s “American 
Bonapartism” singles out racial scapegoats instead of capitalism, while constantly 
furthering the concentration of power in the head of the state and blaming shadowy global 
elites and international finance for destroying the lives of American workers, thus 
articulating elements of structural antisemitism (“Hillary Clinton meets in secret with 
international banks to plot the destruction of U.S. sovereignty”) and anti-black, anti-
muslim, and anti-immigrant racism (“They’re taking our manufacturing jobs. They’re 
taking our money. They’re killing us”). 
 My wager is this: Only a radical anti-capitalist and emancipatory left can “pull the rug 
from under the neo-fascists,” as Cornel West recently put it (2016: n.pag.). As Nancy 
Fraser has argued in a public debate on the “American Elections” (Public Seminar) with 
Andrew Arato, “(neo)liberalism and fascism are [...] two deeply interconnected faces of 
the capitalist world system.” Without a radical left “the maelstrom of capitalist 
‘development’ can only generate liberal forces and authoritarian counterforces, bound 
together in a perverse symbiosis” (Fraser 2016: n.pag.). In this sense, Trump’s victory 
speaks to an authoritarian turn rather than a crumbling liberal order. Epistemologically, 
or onto-epistemologically, the errors and limitations of standpoint theory and identity 
politics respectively—rightfully associated with left-liberal academia and the ‘cultural 
left’—have become glaringly obvious in the realm of political practice. Postmodern (de-)
constructivist notions of “identity” and “difference” have failed to provide a solid 
conceptual framework for emancipatory struggles, particularly in the face of the rise of 
the New Right, as Harold Fluss and Landon Frim have recently argued in the pages of 
Jacobin (“Aliens, Antisemtism, and Academia”) with regard to the Alt-Right discourse and 
strategy. Indeed, they are held dear by left-liberals and right-wing identitarians alike. The 
latter group, of course, embraces a reactionary identity politics of ethno-pluralism (also 
known as Volksgemeinschaft), while the former embraces liberal pluralism, 
multiculturalism, and diversity. In other words: the “cultural left” and “identitarian right,” 
while appearing radically antagonistic, are two sides of the same coin, as many 
(heterodox) Marxists such as Fredric Jameson, Adolph Reed, Vivek Chibber, Wendy 
Brown, or Slavoj Žižek have repeatedly pointed out. 
 But in what sense? Both sides (of the ideological coin) disavow—or pacify by way of 
culturalization—the constitutive social antagonism at the heart of capitalism known as 
class struggle. Both sides disavow the internal contradictions of capital accumulation, 
thus bracketing the “determining [political-economic] form of the social” (Žižek 2006: 
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56). Hence, they end up naturalizing it (in the case of the “cultural left”), or worse (in the 
case of the “identitarian right”), waging a reactionary and displaced form of class struggle 
in the form of anti-immigrant populism, open racism, and structural antisemitism, if not 
outright “race war.” To be sure, the “cultural left” fundamentally opposes the “identitarian 
right.” Yet it has facilitated “a massive resurgence of nativism and Orientalism [as] their 
valorization of the local, their obsession with cultural particularities, and most of all, their 
insistence on culture as the well-spring of agency, has given license to the very exoticism 
that the left once abhorred in colonial depictions of the non-West” (Chibber 2013: 77). 
The New Right on both sides of the Atlantic projects the abstract nature of social 
domination under capitalism onto the phantasmatic figure of the “globalists” or “financial 
elites,” while projecting concrete social antagonisms onto Other/abject figures of 
perceived threats to the nation. The list usually includes “illegal immigrants,” “refugees,” 
“muslim extremists,” “black super-predators,” “thugs,” “Mexican rapists,” and “single 
mothers on welfare,” to name but a few of those charged with disturbing social harmony 
or the smooth functioning of the market. Reactionaries old and new are attached to this 
fantasy with violent passion. The category of the “real people” (Trump) essentially 
depends on the identification of the enemy of the people, as Bonefeld has stringently 
argued.  
There cannot be a real people, a Volk, without the enemy. Nevertheless, identity 
thinking is pseudo-concrete, at best. That is, the identity of the other is both concrete 
and intangible. The real people fear the enemy because each one of them might be 
classified as an enemy of the people, too, at any moment. Rage against the Other is a 
means of expressing nativist identity. Its essence is impotence. Secretly the enraged 
know that. It is because of this that their rage is boundless and all pervasive. Race 
rage makes a people. […] The leader of the Volk does not govern real individuals. He 
governs disciples. (2017: n.pag.) 
 Then again, Donald Trump ain’t David Duke. Yet the dominant strategy of the New 
Right in the United States has been to denounce ‘liberal elites’ and target non-white ‘illegal 
aliens’, ‘refugees’, and ‘muslim extremists,’ thus aiming at the elimination of social 
antagonism by way of exclusion, expulsion, and national chauvinism, rather than 
entertaining fantasies of racial apartheid or extermination. This has put the most 
precarious and stigmatized sections of the working class and those rendered surplus by 
what Joshua Clover has termed “the production of non-production” (2016a: 26)—
particularly young black males—at an even greater risk of falling victim to state violence 
as it greatly emboldened various types of white supremacists (from the KKK to the Alt 
Right) both within the state and civil society. In a nutshell, then, we can say that the New 
Right mostly pits the exploited against the excluded, i.e. excluded even from exploitation 
in the form of wage labor. Hence, the Marxian notion of a “relative surplus population” 
(Marx 1976: 781; cf. ch. 25: “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation”), which today 
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is also commonly “racialized across the West” (Clover 2016a: 26). Such is the state of the 
rat race. 
 Given that some of capitalism’s best managers today are authoritarian regimes, a 
mere defense of liberal democracy and civil society against the onslaught of political 
reaction increasingly appears as a rather hopeless endeavor. The present conjuncture 
forcefully brings to mind Max Horkheimer’s trenchant formulation of the problem on the 
eve of World War II in 1939: “Wer aber vom Kapitalismus nicht reden will, sollte auch 
vom Faschismus schweigen” (1988: 308). Although neoliberalism and fascism are by no 
means normatively equivalent,  
both are products of unrestrained capitalism, which everywhere destabilizes 
lifeworlds and habitats, bringing in its wake both individual liberation and untold 
suffering. Liberalism expresses the first, liberatory side of this process, while 
glossing over the rage and pain associated with the second. Left to fester in the 
absence of an alternative, those sentiments fuel authoritarianisms of every sort, 
including those that really deserve the name fascism and those that emphatically do 
not. (Fraser 2016: n.pag.) 
Here Werner Bonefeld’s critique of authoritarian liberalism helps distinguishing 
Trumpism from Fascism proper. In “Authoritarian Liberalism, Class and Rackets,” 
Bonefeld offers a decidedly critical theoretical account of Trumpism based on 
“understanding the critique of political economy as a critical social theory [which] 
includes the critique of so-called neo-liberalism as the theoretical expression of capitalist 
social relations” (2017: n.pag.). In marked contrast to “normative critics of neoliberalism, 
which reject it abstractly as a doctrine of narrow-minded economic interests, the interests 
of financial capital,” Bonefeld reminds us that the tradition of “authoritarian liberalism 
recognizes the state as indispensible [sic] for the free economy, a conception that is well 
understood by Trump” (2017: n.pag.). His conclusion “bespeaks the time of Trump” as 
that of the governance of an authoritarian neoliberal “racket” at the behest of capitalist 
social relations, to protect the existing regime of accumulation. 
 Moreover, in light of the Alt Right’s (re-)appropriation of postmodern discourse and 
identity politics “for its own chauvinist brand of white identity politics” and of “leftist 
rhetoric as cover for its racialist, nativist, and often misogynistic agendas,” (Fluss/Frim 
2017: n.pag.) cultural studies itself appears in need of a historical materialist regrounding. 
Contesting the New Right without radically contesting neoliberalism in both its 
authoritarian and progressive form is futile: “the rise of every Fascism is always an index 
of a failed revolution” (attributed to Walter Benjamin). A decidedly materialist 
understanding of the neoliberal project in terms of the contradictions of post-Fordist 
capital accumulation and the global consolidation of capitalist class power to save the 
existing regime of accumulation—especially by “dispossession” (Harvey 2005: 160)—is a 
necessary step towards understanding the New Right. In addition, cultural studies can 
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mobilize post-Marxist forms of material-symbolic or conjunctural analysis and also 
engage the Marxist and psychoanalytic critiques of ideology. I am thinking here of an 
unabashedly dialectical cultural studies, more Stuart Hall than Lawrence Grossberg. A 
cultural studies, moreover, that fully embraces the Marxian critique of political economy 
and key concepts of Critical Theory. 
 
Symptomatic Critique 
Tackling the problem of the relationship between the New Right and neoliberalism from 
a decidedly critical theoretical perspective means critiquing the ubiquitous ideological 
naturalization of global capitalism to begin with. To this end, we can effectively mobilize 
Žižek’s Lacanian-Marxist notion of ideology, which challenges the orthodox Marxist 
division between ideological appearances and material reality. Drawing on the work of 
Jacques Lacan as well as Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Žižek argues that “reality” is itself ideological, 
to the extent that it is symbolically structured by a web of social fantasies—bound up with 
reified capitalist social relations—that protect us from the “Real.” The Real is thus posited 
as a traumatic and unrepresentable presence-absence excluded from our symbolically 
constituted reality. However, the Real makes its existence felt in “a series of effects, though 
always in a distorted, displaced way” (Žižek 1989: 163). In other words: For Žižek, 
ideology operates as a social fantasy which structures reality itself against the traumatic 
Real of capital. Thus, the task of ideology critique is to offer a “symptomatic critique” 
(Žižek 1989: 21) that would help drag “the unconditional Real of global Capital” into the 
realm of the Symbolic (Žižek 1999: 4; cf. Fink 1995: 70-72).  
 As Japhy Wilson notes, “this ghostly and traumatic dimension of capital has been most 
successfully theorized by Moishe Postone” (2016: 580). In Time, Labor, and Social 
Domination (1993), Postone follows Marx in arguing that value in capitalist society is 
constituted by socially-necessary labor time, and that capitalist production is undertaken 
for the sole purpose of extracting surplus value through the exploitation of living labor.  
The constantly expanding reproduction of capital increasingly compels all 
capitalists to obey its monolithic logic of self-valorization, and capital comes to exert 
an abstract form of domination that drives towards ‘accumulation for 
accumulation’s sake’, regardless of the social or ecological consequences. Postone 
argues that it is, therefore, capital, rather than the proletariat, that constitutes the 
true subject of history, a subject that the proletariat itself creates through its own 
alienated productive activity. (Wilson 2016: 580) 
As the emergent ‘automatic’ subject of global capitalism, capital is “blind, processual and 
quasi-organic […] an alienated, abstract self-moving Other, characterized by a constant 
directional movement with no external goal” (Postone 1993: 270, 278). It is capital that 
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drives the transition from formal to real subsumption (of labor), through which the labor 
process itself is transformed in accordance with the requirements of capital. With real 
subsumption enabling the production of relative surplus value, through the deployment 
of technologies that increase the productivity of labor and the rate of surplus value 
extraction, capital becomes an abstract form of domination. The transition from the 
formal to the real subsumption is therefore the dynamic that drives the becoming of 
capital as subject. (Postone 1993: 283f) This, as Wilson argues, is where Žižek’s Lacanian-
Marxist conceptual apparatus comes into play. “As an invisible, intangible presence-
absence that dominates our reality without being symbolically included within it,” capital 
is thus Real and “the inert remainder foreclosed from (what we experience as) reality 
returns precisely in the Real of spectral apparitions” (Žižek 2008a: xvi). 
 This has also led Wilson to suggest that reconceptualizing neoliberal ideolgy as “a 
form of obsessional neurosis” (2014: n.pag.) can help explain the relentless persistence of 
what Mark Fisher has called “zombie neoliberalism” (2013: n.pag.), including this 
‘undead’ formation’s paradoxical trajectory towards increasingly intensive forms of social 
engineering and the spread of new forms of biopower. While few embrace the original 
tenets of neoliberalism wholeheartedly, the ideological re-framing of what in fact 
amounts to the consolidation of capitalist class power on a global scale since the late 
1970s as a hyper-rational consensus secured by the doxa of “there is no alternative” 
(Thatcher, Reagan, Clinton, Blair, Merkel, Obama, Clinton, Trudeau, Macron, etc.) enables 
the undead ideology to stagger on regardless. The properly neoliberal consolidation of 
class power in the wake of the crisis of Fordism and the shift to post-Fordism also entailed 
what in Marxian terms can be considered a shift from “profit” to “surplus profit” or “rent,” 
especially relevant to the shift from industrial to post-industrial capitalism and the 
seeking of profits in the sphere of circulation rather than production, among other things. 
At the same time, however, the social disorders resulting from said transformations are 
presented as techno-managerial problems, problems of governance, educational reform, 
market failure, corruption, etc. 
 Rather than simply being unaware of social antagonism, we usually continue to act as 
if we do not know, following the basic structure of fetishistic disavowal (“I know very well, 
but...”). However, if we concur with Žižek and Jameson’s much-cited diagnosis of late 
capitalism’s post-apocalyptic cultural Imaginary (“it is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism”) or with Mark Fisher’s critique of 
Capitalist Realism, where capitalism “seamlessly occupies the horizons of the thinkable,” 
(2009: 8) then fetishistic disavowal may not simply work in the service of the pleasure 
principle or obsessional neurosis but signify a rather tragic-farcical deadlock—cemented 
by fear. Either way, what is repressed, or foreclosed from the Symbolic, not only returns 
(violently) in the Real (the return of the riot, surplus rebellions, refugees, new forms of 
apartheid, etc.) but also appears in necessarily distorted forms in the cultural and political 
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Imaginary. It finds displaced expression in cultural representations and constantly gets 
re-articulated discursively. Conjunctural analysis radically historicizes and contextualizes 
discursive articulations, power relations, and the work of culture, contesting today’s post-
political (neo)liberal consensus by way of demystification and the foregrounding of 
historical contingency. Žižekian ideology critique actively seeks to work against fetishistic 
disavowal by way of assailing the social fantasies that protect us from the Real (of capital). 
 Žižek’s (in)famous aphorism “Nature does not exist,” for instance, has been forcefully 
rejected and variously branded as cynicism or “postmodern nonsense” by 
environmentalists, positivists, and left-liberal activists, most of whom are of course 
unfamiliar with Žižek’s epistemology and conceptual apparatus. What, then, is the 
problem with “Nature?” Ecology qua Nature as the “big Other” is a paradigmatic 
expression of the structure of fantasy in the Lacanian sense. As the floating signifier 
“Nature” by definition cannot be permanently quilted discursively, the resulting void of 
meaning is necessarily captured by a multiplying series of fantasies that try to bridge the 
constitutive gap between a) the indeterminacies of natures (and the associated fear of the 
continuous return of the meaningless Real of nature in the guise of ecological disasters), 
and b) the always frustrated desire—experienced as loss—for some sort of equilibrium 
or harmonious way of being (that disavows the absence of a foundation). “It is in this 
phantasmagorical space that the properly political dimension disappears to be replaced 
by a consensually established frame that calls for techno-managerial action in the name 
of humanity, social integration, the earth and its human and non-human inhabitants, all 
peoples in all places” (Swyngedouw 2014: 31). As Erik Swyngedouw further emphasizes, 
“such post-political arrangement signals a thoroughly depoliticized public space” (2014: 
31). 
 Both Žižek and Alain Badiou insist that ecology has become the new opium for the 
masses, replacing religion as the axis around which our fear for social disintegration 
becomes articulated, “but without the promise of redemption—it is apocalypse forever 
postponed—a discursive matrix of recurrent crisis” (2014: 31)  
Let’s start by stating that after ‘the rights of man’, the rise of the ‘the rights of Nature’ 
is a contemporary form of the opium for the people. It is an only slightly camouflaged 
religion: the millenarian terror, concern for everything save the properly political 
destiny of peoples, new instruments for control of everyday life, the fear of death 
and catastrophes […]. It is a gigantic operation in the depoliticization of subjects. 
(Badiou qtd. in Swyngedouw 2014: 23) 
 Until recently there has been a virtually unchallenged consensus over the need to be 
more “environmentally sustainable” if disaster is to be avoided. In this consensual setting, 
socio-ecological problems are generally staged as universally threatening to the survival 
of mankind and sustained by what Mike Davis called “ecologies of fear” (cf. Davis 1998) 
as well as a decidedly neoliberal progressivism. A major ‘quilting point’ for the climate 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 2 (2018): 4-19 
 
Büscher-Ulbrich: The New Right, Neoliberalism, and the Real of Capital 11 
change problematic is CO2—the objet petit a that “simultaneously expresses our deepest 
fears and around which the desire for change is woven” (Swyngedouw 2014: 25f). The 
fetishist disavowal of the multiple, complex and often contingent relations through which 
environmental change unfolds “finds its completion in the double reductionism to this 
singular socio-chemical component” (Swyngedouw 2014: 25f). The commodification of 
CO2—mainly via the Kyoto protocol—has further created a growing derivatives market 
dependent on a decidedly neoliberal governance regime which permits incorporating the 
atmosphere into the logic of capital. An authoritarian right-wing populist like Trump, 
however, rips into this kind of depoliticized neoliberal ecology just to return to business 
as usual, calling climate change as such ‘a hoax.’ In other words: We move from neoliberal 
disavowal to right-wing conspiracy theory, as neoliberal neurosis gives way to right-wing 
paranoia. Out of the frying pan into the fire. 
 To invoke a second example of fetishistic disavowal in the context of the New Right, I 
suggest to take a virtually random look at the Huffington Post and its account of the rise 
of Trump and the New Right both sides of the Atlantic. The following is an excerpt from 
Salman Sakir’s commentary on “Neoliberalism and the Rise of Right-Wing Politics,” 
published on November 11, 2016. 
The suffering of the working class and middle-class have led to rise of angst and anger 
among this segment of the population, which is a majority in many developed 
countries. They are disillusioned with globalization and free trade, and the way it has 
wreaked havoc to their livelihood. (my emphasis) Also, the social programs in the 
developed countries have been inadequate to help these disenfranchised people. 
This led to these people rallying against the establishment in these countries 
contributing to the rise of anti-establishment popularity among the masses and 
support of right-wing politics, including far-right politics, in these countries. The 
disillusionment and resentment with neoliberalism, globalization and insufficient 
social programs have contributed to Brexit in the UK, Donald Trump being elected 
in the US and the rise of right-wing parties in France, Germany, etc. The introduction 
of subsidies and lower corporate taxes (my emphasis) can encourage companies to 
produce domestically and even re-shore, which is bringing back jobs to their home 
countries. This may improve employment in some types of manufacturing and 
service sectors in the developed countries. Again, incentives in terms of lower tax 
rates can be offered to corporations (my emphasis) to bring their overseas profits to 
their home countries. A combination of these economic and public policies 
accompanied by social policies like increased awareness among the population of 
the benefits of immigration will definitely reduce the anger and disillusionment 
among the adversely affected sections of the population in developed countries. 
Policies that benefit all sections of the population so that they enjoy the benefits of 
globalization, outsourcing and automation will reap rich rewards in terms of higher 
economic, social and political stability and harmony. (my emphasis) This will make 
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This form of disavowal of the Real of capital and social antagonism is (un)surprisingly in 
tune with what Trump, Le Pen, and others have themselves proclaimed (in terms of socio-
economic promises about “re-shoring” and the like) during their respective election 
campaigns—the articles ‘progressive’ neoliberal sentiment notwithstanding. In fact, it is 
crucial to note that fetishistic disavowal in general works precisely in such a way that it 
disavows the Real of capital through its symptoms (“suffering of the working class,” “rise 
of anti-establishment popularity among the masses,” “outsourcing and automation”) 
rather than denying them. Paradoxically, therefore, neoliberal recipes (“globalization and 
free trade,” “subsidies and lower corporate taxes,” “benefits of […] outsourcing and 
automation,” “Policies that benefit all sections of the population”) can still be presented 
as the one-size-fits-all fix to capitalism’s long crisis without ever mentioning, for instance, 
the surplus absorption problem, i.e. of both capital and labor. 
 Regarding the “appeal” of right-wing politics it is worth taking a look at the Invisible 
Committe’s The Coming Insurrection, which frames the problem of the New Right in terms 
of a broadly Situationist critique of dispossession and alienation: “We have been 
expropriated from our own language by education, from our songs by reality TV contests, 
from our flesh by mass pornography, from our city by the police, and from our friends by 
wage-labor” (2009: 36). Similar to what Bonefeld calls Trump’s “disciples,” the Invisible 
Committee argues: 
The Frenchman is the embodiment of the dispossessed, the destitute. His hatred of 
foreigners is based on his hatred of himself as a foreigner. The mixture of jealousy 
and fear he feels toward the ‘cités’ expresses nothing but his resentment for all he 
has lost. […] We have arrived at a point of privation where the only way to feel 
French is to curse the immigrants and those who are more visibly foreign. The 
immigrants assume a curious position of sovereignty: if they weren’t here, the French 
might stop existing. (2009: 36f) 
Here we have come full circle to the problem of ‘the people.’ I thus want to move on to the 
question of ideological interpellation, well exemplified by the problem of racism. 
 
Racialization, Proletarianization, and Ideological Struggle 
Particularly in the United States, what Loïc Wacquant has called the “neoliberal 
government of social insecurity” has severely weakened the “Left hand” and greatly 
empowered the “Right hand” of the state in order to “regulate” the effects of economic 
deregulation and welfare state retrenchment by way of “wedding restrictive ‘workfare’ 
and expansive ‘prisonfare’” (Wacquant 2009: 287). In the face of these developments, a 
sociological analysis of “symbolic power” (Bourdieu) is increasingly rendered obsolete by 
drastic austerity, carceral management, and state violence. The neoliberal state’s 
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authoritarian response to poverty and economic crisis particularly affects the most 
precarious and commonly racialized sections of the working class that constitute the so-
called “surplus proletariat” (Surplus Club 2017: n.pag.). Here Joshua Clover’s historical 
materialist theory of riots and “the new era of uprisings”—from Watts, Newark, and 
Detroit to Oakland, Ferguson, Baltimore, and beyond—puts a spotlight on the relation 
between riot and crisis as well as the racialization of the riot since the 1960s (cf. 2016a: 
8-11, 168-74). Clover explains the return of the riot in terms of a global restructuring of 
class composition driven by the crisis-tendency of capital itself as well as its neoliberal 
management and policing: “Uneven deindustrialization first displaces black workers into 
informal economies and market struggles, people who now confront extreme policing, 
hyperincarceration, and the lived experience of being surplus to the needs of the 
economy. These are the exemplary subjects […] of a global recomposition of class within 
which the riot of surplus populations is not a likelihood but a certainty.” (2016b: n.pag.) 
It should thus be considered reductive to identify the contemporary uprisings mentioned 
above as “race riots” rather than “circulation struggles” (Clover 2016a: 175) of racialized 
surplus proletarians that are effectively disrupting not just the Rancièrean “police” and its 
“distribution.” (Rancière 1999: 21f) 
 Marx famously analyzed the production of “relative surplus populations” (vulgo: 
structural un- and underemployment) alongside the reproduction of the wage-relation in 
chapter 25 of Capital. Clover has aptly termed this dialectical process “the production of 
nonproduction” (2016a: 26), which emphasizes the fact that twin phenomena of 
exploitation and exclusion are not simply opposed to each other, but both mediated, 
though not mechanically determined, by the historical dynamic of capitalist accumulation. 
Hence, Michael Denning’s quip that “[u]nder capitalism, the only thing worse than being 
exploited is not being exploited” (2010: 79). Judging from the perspective of the longue 
durée of chattel slavery and the capitalist plantation system analyzed by Marx to the 
African-American ghetto and the carceral management and militarized policing of 
racialized surplus populations analyzed by Chris Chen, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Keeanga 
Yamahtta Taylor, and Loïc Wacquant, it seems mistaken to even try to disentangle race 
and class relations, especially in the United States. “Race,” as Stuart Hall put it, is a 
“modality in which class is ‘lived’” (1980: 341). To conceptualize the intersection of race 
and class as a materialist would mean to think racialization and proletarianization 
together, as in Chen’s concise formulation of the dilemma: 
The rise of the anti-black U.S. carceral state from the 1970s onward exemplifies 
rituals of state and civilian violence which enforce the racialization of wageless life, 
and the racial ascription of wagelessness. From the point of view of capital, “race” is 
renewed [...] through the racialization of unwaged surplus or superfluous 
populations from Khartoum to the slums of Cairo. (2013: 217) 
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 Regarding ideological struggle, it is tempting to use Rancièrean key concepts to 
theorize race and racism in terms of an anti-black “distribution” and anti-black “police,” 
which at least would have the benefit of avoiding the quasi-essentializing notions of (anti-
)blackness and (critical) whiteness. But what exactly is at stake in this theoretical war of 
maneuver? For Rancière, the dominant ideology today—although he never uses the term 
explicitly—can be said to be one of depoliticization. The suturing logic of “police” aims at 
a de facto positivization of the entire social sphere. And we should add that this kind of 
“distribution” is fundamentally aligned with the needs of global capital and contingent on 
“race-making institutions” from slavery and apartheid to the (hyper)ghetto and the 
prison. (cf. Wacquant 2009: 196) It has been argued by some that Rancière’s critical 
thinking is ignorant of race and racism, which indeed it rarely addresses due to its focus 
on the universality of political disagreement [mésentente] and (de-)subjectivization. In a 
more recent essay, however, Rancière identifies racism as “a passion from above,” 
focusing on the logic of the neoliberal state: 
Today’s racism is [...] primarily a logic of the state and not a popular passion. And 
this state logic is primarily supported not by who knows what backward social 
groups but by a substantial part of the intellectual elite. [...] The invocation of 
universality in fact advances its opposite: the establishment of a discretionary state 
power that decides who belongs and who doesn’t belong to the class of those who 
have the right to be here; the power, in short, to confer and remove identities. That 
power has its correlate: the power to oblige individuals to be identifiable at all times, 
to keep themselves in a space of full visibility before the state. [… A] lot of energy 
has been spent against a certain figure of racism—embodied in the Front National—
and a certain idea that this racism is the expression of “white trash” [petit blancs] 
and represents the backward layers of society. A substantial part of that energy has 
been recuperated to build the legitimacy of a new form of racism: state racism and 
“Leftist” intellectual racism. It is perhaps time to reorient our thinking and struggle 
against a theory and practice of stigmatization, precarization, and exclusion which 
today constitutes a racism from above: a logic of the state and a passion of the 
intelligentsia. (2010: n.pag.) 
Regarding such racism “from above,” Adolph Reed has stringently argued that it is 
“particularly important at this moment to recognize that the familiar taxonomy of racial 
difference is but one historically specific instance of a genus of ideologies of ascriptive 
hierarchy that stabilize capitalist social reproduction” (2013: 53). According to Reed, “the 
‘underclass’ [as such] could become even more race-like as a distinctive, essentialized 
population” since anti-racism and gender equality “are now also incorporated into the 
normative and programmatic structure” of a progressive neoliberalism, inasmuch as the 
“pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of given patterns of 
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 In the context of the specifically US-American dilemma of anti-black racism and police 
violence, there may be more to be gained from Reed’s and Wacquant’s analysis than from 
Rancière’s, which is closely bound to the French national situation. Leaving the detailed 
sociological analysis of the “police” behind and assuming its logic to be more or less 
universal, Rancière’s post-Althusserian theory polemically reclaims the notion of politics 
and inquires into the conditions of (im-)possibility of the emergence of a political subject. 
By rethinking politics exclusively from the perspective of the sans-part, while sidelining 
both the critique of ideology and the sociological analysis of modes of recuperation into 
power (not to mention the bracketing of Marxian critique of political economy), Rancière 
thus pits the sequence of desubjectification and political subjectivation constitutive of 
emancipatory politics against the determinations of Bourdieu’s habitus-field theory and 
analysis of symbolic power—as he did against Althusser’s account of ideological “hailing” 
and the material-symbolic force of ideological “interpellation.” It is crucial to note, 
however, that Rancière does not simply reject the latter but re-conceptualizes it as a kind 
of non-interpellation: “Move along, there is nothing to see here!” This, then, is the ultimate 
“consensual” rationale of what Rancière aptly calls “police”. If we want to avoid lapsing 
into idealism though, this needs to be related to the sphere of circulation (of bodies and 
commodities) and the logic of state and capital. Clover thus rightfully insists that 
“regardless of perspective, riots have achieved an intransigent social centrality” (2016a: 
2). For the commonly racialized surplus proletarians “no longer directly necessary for the 
self-valorization of capital” (Marx 1976: 557), “the police now stand in the place of the 
economy, the violence of the economy made flesh” (Clover 2016a: 125). 
 Neoliberalism’s thoroughly depoliticized public sphere is a product of, among other 
things, its entrenchment of “public-private partnerships” and profit-driven techno-
managerial solutions to what are, in fact, genuinely political-economic contradictions and 
a fundamental social antagonism between capital and labor. It is therefore crucial to not 
settle for a liberal humanist critique of neoliberal capitalism as a deviant and morally 
bankrupt form of what otherwise could amount to a humane capitalism, or “capitalism 
with a human face,” which is itself part and parcel of the dominant social fantasy that 
remains fundamentally unchallenged by Trump and his acolytes. The New Right, of 
course, does manage to interpellate individuals into new ideological subject positions of 
the most reactionary kind. Instead of the egalitarian political notion of “the people,” as a 
symbolic operator of declassification (Rancière)—the excluded demos or sans part as the 
paradigmatic site of universality, we get the reactionary ethno-nationalist notion of “a 
people”—the Volk, or, in the case of Trump, “real people.” If it is true that “[r]ace rage 
makes a people” (Bonefeld 2016: n.pag.) it is all the more troublesome that there will be 
no shortage of racialized others/enemies to constitute the “real people” in national 
situations on a planetary scale. As Andy Merrifield argues in The New Urban Question, 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 2 (2018): 4-19 
 
Büscher-Ulbrich: The New Right, Neoliberalism, and the Real of Capital 16 
[w]hat’s happening today in Paris or Chicago, then, is a revealing microcosm of a 
larger macrocosm. Paris is a cell-form of a bigger urban tissuing that’s constituted 
by a mosaic of centers and peripheries scattered all over the globe, a patchwork quilt 
of socio-spatial and racial apartheid that goes for Paris as for Palestine, for London 
as for Rio, for Johannesburg as for New York. Differences are differences of degree 
not substance, not in the essential unity of process, engineered as it is by a global 
ruling class. Nowadays, the poor global South exists in North-East Paris, or in Queens 
and Tower Hamlets. And the rich global North lives high above the streets of 
Mumbai, and flies home in helicopters to its penthouses in Sao Paulo. (2014: 30). 
In other words: The Marxist notion of “combined and uneven development” (Trotsky) 
today signifies spatial apartheid. Centers and peripheries are immanent within the global 
accumulation of capital. Proletarianization and racialization increasingly coincide. This 
returns us to the already mentioned antagonism between the exploited and the excluded, 
and the question of how to stop the onslaught of political reaction. The hegemonic 
(neo)liberal notion of democracy also deals with the excluded, but it focuses on their 
inclusion, as minority voices, without contesting the logic of state and capital. What gets 
lost in this, Žižek argues, is “the position of universality embodied in the excluded” and 
the prospect that “the new emancipatory politics will no longer be the act of a particular 
social agent, but an explosive combination of different agents” (2009: n.pag.).  
 Starting from scattered clues left by Marx and his successors, especially Rosa 
Luxemburg, Mike Davis has recently outlined “a theory of class formation and socialist 
hegemony” in the pages of Catalyst that is premised on the thesis that “‘agency’ in the last 
instance is conditioned by the development of the productive forces but activated by the 
convergence (or ‘overdeterminations’) of political, economic, and cultural struggles” 
(2017: n.pag.). In doing so, Davis and others crucially resist the post-Marxist 
appropriation of Gramsci’s decidedly materialist theory of hegemony, thus refusing both 
to desubstantialize power and to sever the link between political economy and social 
struggles. This is doubly true for the left communist Endnotes collective, which formed in 
the US and the UK in 2008 and publishes an eponymous journal that Perry Anderson 
called one of the “most impressive publications to emerge in the Bush-Obama era” (2014: 
65). Endnotes emerged from narrow Marxist debates, often drawing on the critique of 
political economy, historical materialism, debates in the French ultra-left, and American 
critical race theory, but the journal supplemented critical theory with exhaustive analysis 
of social movements in the aftermath of the 2008 crash. For Endnotes, “our current age of 
riots and occupations demands that we confront again the unfashionable question of the 
revolutionary subject” (Barker 2017: n.pag.). This opens onto questions of superfluity, 
gender, and racialization, which Endnotes takes up in a decidedly materialist way. Among 
philosophers, moreover, it was Alain Badiou who most adamantly affirmed “the need to 
re-install the communist hypothesis—the proposition that the subordination of labor to 
the dominant class is not inevitable—within the ideological sphere” (2008: n.pag.). 
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 At a time when the most precarious and stigmatized sections of the working class, 
including those rendered surplus by “the production of non-production” (Clover), are put 
at an ever greater risk of falling victim to state violence as a consequence of racism and 
“wageless life” (Denning), the New Right is pitting exploited wage laborers defined in 
nativist terms against dispossessed and racialized surplus proletarians without remorse. 
While the path of global class restructuring that neoliberal capital has taken since the 
1970s has been one of intensified differentiation and inequality, the much greater 
inequality is between plutocratic capital and both wage laborers and surplus proletarians. 
Liberalism narrowly focuses on the latter’s recognition and inclusion, while disavowing 
the Real of capital through one of its most acute symptoms. What gets lost in this framing 
of the problem is the question of political subjectivity (of the dispossessed) and what it 
means to grasp categories of social critique as simultaneously abstract and concrete: the 
ability to critique discussions already “saturated by an excessive empiricism whereby 
categories of ‘discrimination,’ ‘exclusion’ and ‘expulsion’ [of labor] reductively obscure 
the antagonistic social processes constitutive of the capital-labor relation” (Surplus Club 
2017: n.pag.). Cultural studies needs to confront these liberal blindspots to fully grasp the 
significance of the New Right’s political pandering to those who are indispensable for the 
accumulation and reproduction of capital and those who prove themselves useful to its 
unrestricted rule—whether as state functionaries, corporate managers, or fascist thugs on 
the streets of Charlottesville and elsewhere. 
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